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ABSTRACT
Attacks based on power analysis have been long existing and stud-
ied, with some recent works focused on data exfiltration from victim
systems without using conventional communications (e.g., WiFi).
Nonetheless, prior works typically rely on intrusive direct power
measurement, either by implanting meters in the power outlet or
tapping into the power cable, thus jeopardizing the stealthiness of at-
tacks. In this paper, we propose NoDE (Noise for Data Exfiltration),
a new system for stealthy data exfiltration from enterprise desk-
top computers. Specifically, NoDE achieves data exfiltration over
a building’s power network by exploiting high-frequency voltage
ripples (i.e., switching noises) generated by power factor correction
circuits built into today’s computers. Located at a distance and even
from a different room, the receiver can non-intrusively measure
the voltage of a power outlet to capture the high-frequency switch-
ing noises for online information decoding without supervised
training/learning. To evaluate NoDE, we run experiments on seven
different computers from top vendors and using top-brand power
supply units. Our results show that for a single transmitter, NoDE
achieves a rate of up to 28.48 bits/second with a distance of 90 feet
(27.4 meters) without the line of sight, demonstrating a practically
stealthy threat. Based on the orthogonality of switching noise fre-
quencies of different computers, we also demonstrate simultaneous
data exfiltration from four computers using only one receiver. Fi-
nally, we present a few possible defenses, such as installing noise
filters, and discuss their limitations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The total number of registered malware samples has grown by 36%
in the past year and reached an all-time high of 690 million, let
alone the huge number of undiscovered malware [59]. Importantly,
more than 70% of the malware threats are in the form of phishing,
spywares, and Trojans that aim at stealing sensitive information,
especially from end users in companies, universities, among others
(which we collectively refer to as enterprise) [70].
In the wake of growing risks of data theft, a proactive defense
is to keep sensitive data within an enterprise network at all times.
Nonetheless, this approach is vulnerable to various types of covert
channel attacks, through which sensitive data is stealthily trans-
ferred to a program that can access external networks and eventu-
ally send information to the outside [11, 50, 69]. For example, one
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program’s usage pattern of CPU resources, if detected by another
program, can be modulated for information transfer between the
two [50, 57]. Consequently, to mitigate data theft risks, enterprise
users commonly have restricted access to outside networks — all
data transfer from and to the outside is tightly scrutinized.
Nevertheless, such systems may still suffer from data exfiltration
attacks that bypass the conventional communications protocols
(e.g., WiFi) by transforming the affected computer into a transmitter
and establishing a covert channel. For example, the transmitting
computer can modulate the intensity of the generated acoustic
noise by varying its cooling fan or hard disk spinning speed to
carry 1/0 bit information (e.g., a high fan noise represents “1” and
“0” otherwise), while a nearby receiver with a microphone can hear
the noise and decode the carried bits [8, 32, 34, 38]. Likewise, the
power consumption [35, 73], the amount of generated heat [31], the
electromagnetic interference (EMI) [29, 30], the system status LEDs
[37, 55], and magnetic signal (to escape a Faraday cage) [36, 58] can
all be modulated in a similar manner for data exfiltration.
Our contribution. We contribute to the existing body of re-
search by designing a new data exfiltration system, called NoDE
(Noise for Data Exfiltration), where a malware modulates the vic-
tim computer’s power consumption to send data over a building’s
power network to the attacker’s receiver. The key novelty is that
NoDE uniquely exploits high-frequency voltage ripples (i.e., elec-
tronic switching noises) generated by power factor correction (PFC)
circuits built into today’s power supply units for power-consuming
devices like computers. Like the existing data exfiltration attacks
(Table 3), NoDE exhibits several desirable properties: a reasonable
achievable bit rate (28.48 bits/s), good effective distance (27.4 me-
ters), and no line-of-sight requirement. Additionally, based on an
in-depth investigation of how PFC-induced switching noises relate
to a computer’s power consumption, NoDE adds the following two
distinguishing features to the literature.
• Indirect power measurement. NoDE uses indirect power mea-
surement that does not require any tampering of the building’s
power network and hence is more stealthy. Here, being indirect
means that the target computer’s current does not directly flow
through the attacker’s sensing device at the receiver; instead, the
receiver only measures voltage signals containing PFC-induced
switching noises which we find are correlated with the target com-
puter’s power/current. Nonetheless, the existing power-based data
exfiltration attacks rely on direct power measurement and hence
are less stealthy [23, 35, 73]: a power meter is directly connected to
the outlet or a sensing apparatus is placed along the cable directly
powering the target device.
• Simultaneous data exfiltration.We identify the (approximate)
orthogonality nature of PFC-induced switching noises in practice,
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thus allowing simultaneous data exfiltration from multiple comput-
ers to a single receiver without much interference. Thus, if multiple
computers within the same power network are infected, only a
single receiver is needed to exfiltrate data from these computers in
parallel. This results in a higher overall exfiltration rate due to the
multiple parallel data streams.
More concretely, we focus on an enterprise environment, with
the goal of stealthy data exfiltration from a desktop computer. Note
that, we do not target military-grade systems that have sophis-
ticated and expensive defense against information leakages (e.g.,
TEMPEST [26]). We first observe that the amplitude information of
a computer’s electric current, and hence the power consumption,
is contained in the voltage at any other power outlet connected to
the same building’s power network.
In practice, however, it is very challenging to directly extract the
current amplitude of the target computer from the voltage measure-
ment, which consists of a blend of current amplitude information
of all the devices within the same power network (Section 4.1).
This is further compounded by the power grid’s random voltage
fluctuations which can be several order-of-magnitude larger than
the voltage variation caused by current amplitude variations.
We find that all desktop computers today are mandated to have
built-in power PFC circuits in their power supply units to reduce
harmonics [18, 43, 64]. Importantly, these PFC circuits result in
prominent high-frequency current ripples between 40kHz and
150kHz [64], whose amplitude changes with the computer’s power
consumption — the higher power consumption, the taller ripples,
and vice-versa. These high-frequency current ripples also produce
high-frequency voltage ripples at other power outlets, which are re-
ferred to switching noises. Thus, by properly filtering the received
voltage signals at a power outlet, switching noises can be retained
and the receiver is able to successfully extract information about
the transmitter’s modulated current amplitude. Further, the switch-
ing noise frequencies are typically different for different computers
and hence are not subject to much interference. This orthogonality
of switching noises allows simultaneous data exfiltration attacks
from multiple computers by a single receiver.
We present an end-to-end design of NoDE. Like any normal
programs, NoDE only uses the transmitter’s CPU resource without
any special privilege (e.g., Kernel access). Any device with data
storage, such as a laptop and a cellphone, as well as an added
analog-to-digital converter (ADC, to digitize the voltage signals)
plugged into a power outlet can be used as a receiver. Moreover,
NoDE does not require any offline training or calibration using
supervised classification algorithms.
To demonstrate the practical applicability of NoDE, we run ex-
periments on seven computers with different configurations and
vendors in four different labs/offices in two separate buildings.
We also achieve successful exfiltration even when four computers
send data simultaneously to a single receiver. We show that NoDE
achieves successful data exfiltration with an effective rate of up
to 28.48 bits/second, which is reasonably high compared to many
existing covert channels [28, 29, 73]. More importantly, the receiver
can be located in a different room approximately 90 feet (27.4 me-
ters) away from the transmitter. Finally, we also present a set of
possible defense mechanisms, such as installing noise filters, and
discuss their limitations.
2 FEATURES OF NODE AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first discuss NoDE’s distinguishing features
and advantages under its own subclass of power analysis-based
side/covert channel attacks. Then, we provide a note on the current
PFC design in power electronics.
2.1 Power Analysis-based Attacks
NoDE falls under the power analysis-based attacks, and we identify
the key differences of NoDE from the existing works. With power
usage information of the victim, prior studies have achieved se-
cret key extraction from smart cards and mobile devices [6, 23, 56],
anomaly detection in embedded systems [14, 54, 66], tracking web-
sites [13, 79], among others. Besides the orthogonal context and
objective, our work stands apart from the prior studies in the fol-
lowing key aspects.
Power measurement. A prominent assumption made by many
existing attacks is that the target system’s power consumption (or
current) can be directly measured [13, 79]. Nonetheless, this can
only be accomplished if the sensing apparatus is placed directly
inside the target system or at the nearest power outlet (indicated by
Fig. 1(a) and A○ in Fig. 1(b)). Moreover, theway that the transmitter’s
current is measured (e.g., measuring current at B○ in Fig. 1(b)) [35]
results in a very low bit rate because of strong interference from
other computers and/or devices.
By sharp contrast, NoDE can collect voltage signals from any
outlet within the same power network as the transmitter, and iden-
tifies and focuses on a unique frequency band for each transmitter,
thus achieving stealthy data exfiltration (even simultaneously from
multiple transmitters).
Offline training. The studies on side channel attacks using
power analysis are prolific, e.g., recognizing TV content out of volt-
age signal measurement from a nearby outlet [19] and identifying
human gestures using body-induced electric signals [15]. Nonethe-
less, these studies typically apply supervised machine learning
models and need to extract a set of features from the collected
power signals and compare them against a set of pre-recorded pat-
terns for recognition. Thus, offline model training on the target
system under a controlled environment is required. Clearly, this is
not feasible in our context for stealthy reasons.
Our design is fundamentally different and does not need to
match received signals against pre-trained patterns, which can
significantly differ from runtime conditions. Instead, to receive new
information from the target computer on the fly, NoDE adapts its
1/0 bit decision threshold and filter’s passband based on a small
pre-determined pilot sequence on a frame-by-frame basis.
Simultaneous transmission using orthogonal signals. In
addition to the intrusive nature, direct power measurement requires
dedicated power meters (i.e., receivers) for each target computer.
Placing a power mater at a higher level in the power network (e.g.,
at B○ in Fig. 1(b)) to capture multiple transmitters does not work
as the current signals from the transmitters as well as other equip-
ment are superimposed in the readings and hard to distinguish.
While NoDE also collects a mix of signals from all equipment, it
can still separate each transmitted signal in the high frequency
(10kHz∼150kHz) using the insight that PFC circuits generate or-
thogonal high-frequency switching noises (Fig. 12).
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Target
1
2
(a) Direct vs indirect power mea-
surement
Target
B
A
(b) Direct sensing device locations
Figure 1: (a) 1○ is direct measurement using a sensing coil
or register placed along the direct power path . 2○ is indirect
voltage sensing. (b) Possible direct sensing device locations,
such as A○ and B○. However, location B○ measures superim-
posed power consumption of multiple outlets.
While some side channel attacks directly look at the current
amplitude [13, 79], the study [20] considers a wide frequency band
(e.g., 1∼60kHz) of collected voltage signals. Thus, when other ap-
pliances or multiple victims are present, strong interference can be
produced. For example, the attack is demonstrated on only one TV
in a home or small lab with a relatively clean power network [20].
By contrast, for each transmitter, we precisely extract the frequency
feature over a proper narrow band (e.g., 60Hz) without strong in-
terference from other devices, thus achieving simultaneous data
exfiltration from multiple transmitters in a large lab with about 30
active computers (Section 6.2.2).
NoDE also differs from [44] which utilizes a wider frequency
band (i.e., 1kHz or more) and estimates a data center-wide aggre-
gated power consumption over a much lower time resolution (i.e.,
once every minute) for load injection attacks. Whereas, NoDE is
specifically designed to detect individual power consumption at a
time resolution of milliseconds.
2.2 NoDE and TEMPEST
Electromagnetic emission has long been known as a major source
of information leakage [41]. Notably, the eavesdropping on elec-
tromagnetic radiation (EMR) of communication equipment in the
early-mid 1900s leads to the development of, to date partially classi-
fied, defense technologies code-named TEMPEST [26]. The recently
declassified TEMPEST defense imposes stringent restrictions on
electromagnetic radiation from computer systems both over the
air and through power lines [26]. However, TEMPEST defense,
shielding equipment and/or Faraday caging, is very expensive and
mainly used in military application. For example, NATO countries
spend billions of dollar of their defense budget each year for TEM-
PEST shielding [1]. While the defense requirement is outlined, the
technology for TEMPEST attacks still remains classified. There is
skepticism on the feasibility of TEMPEST attacks [26, 40], not to
mention the sophisticated sensing equipment necessary to carry
out such an attack. Consequently, typical enterprise environments
(e.g., companies), which are our target systems, may not necessarily
adhere to the costly TEMPEST defense practices.
A relatively inexpensive alternative to TEMPEST using software,
named Soft-TEMPEST is proposed in [48]. Soft-TEMPEST targets
obsolete CRT monitors and mainly reduces the electromagnetic
Transmitter(s) Receiver
ADC
2 31
Figure 2: Threat model. 1○Modulation program in the trans-
mitter. 2○Building’s power network. 3○An analog-to-digital
converter inside an innocuous-looking device.
emission distance, whereas NoDE utilizes power networks for data
exfiltration at a distance.
2.3 Power Electronics
It is well known in the field of power electronics that the high-
frequency switching operation in PFC circuits produces voltage
noises and is fundamental for improving the power factor of appli-
ances [64, 80]. The existing research on PFC designs is primarily
from the efficiency perspective, e.g., how to select the conduction
mode and switching frequency to achieve the best energy efficiency
of power supply units and meet regulation compliances [64]. In
sharp contrast, there is much less understanding from the adver-
sarial perspective: how can the PFC-induced switching noises be ex-
ploited as useful signals for stealthy data exfiltration attacks? NoDE
fills the gap by performing an in-depth study of how the switching
noise amplitude relates to a computer’s power consumption and
uniquely transforming switching noises of a computer’s power
supply unit into data-carrying signals for data exfiltration.
3 THREAT MODEL
We consider a broadly-interpreted enterprise environment (such
as company and university) which is a primary target for data
theft [12, 77]. We focus on a desktop computer, because it is the
predominant type of computer (especially for storing important
data) and its built-in PFC circuit is suitable for information transfer
(Section 4.3). For brevity, we also use “transmitter” or “computer”
to denote the transmitting desktop computer.
Our threat model is illustrated in Fig. 2, including one or more
transmitters and a receiver. Both the transmitters and receiver are
connected to the same building’s power network. Note that, because
typically there are filters between different buildings’ power net-
works, even dedicated PLC adapters cannot reliably communicate
across different buildings [7].
Transmitter. A transmitter is a desktop computer infected by
malware that intends to send sensitive information (e.g., password
and financial information) to the outside without using any net-
work or removable storage. Like in the existing literature on covert
channels, our threat model builds upon the malware’s capability
of obtaining sensitive information, and is not intended for sending
large files due to rate limits. The malware can use the transmit-
ter’s CPU like any normal programs, but no special privileges are
assumed by NoDE. Importantly, while it leverages the building’s
power network, NoDE does not need to intrusively install a new
or use an existing dedicated PLC adapter in the target transmitter.
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Receiver. The receiver can be any innocuous-looking device
that is plugged into an outlet in the same building’s power network
as the transmitter. The receiver needs an ADC for digitizing its
received voltage, which is universally used by any signal-collecting
digital systems (e.g., digital temperature sensor) and can be easily
hidden inside a laptop/cellphone charger. Moreover, the receiver can
be located in a distant room different than the transmitter. Thus,
there is no prohibitive requirement for a receiver. Even though
the building is solely occupied by a single enterprise, guests are
typically still allowed to plug their laptops or cellphones into an
outlet for charging.
Practicality of malware injection. While there are various
ways that malware can get into a computer, we classify them into
two categories — easy and hard — based on the level of difficulty
and effort required for malware infection.
• Easy: We consider themalware injection “easy” when the target
computer can take input from the outside through external media
and/or networks. For example, the target computer can get infected
with malware when it visits malicious webpages or is connected
to an effected USB drive, during which malware can be implanted
without being noticed. It is the predominant approach of malware
injection for today’s enterprise environments [70]. Not to mention
those malware injection incidents affecting millions of Internet
users every day [59, 70], a striking example of infecting a mission-
critical system is that the malware Stuxnet infected Iran’s nuclear
program through an infected USB drive [49, 51].
• Hard: We consider that the malware injection is “hard” when
there is no easy approach to malware injection. For example, the
target computer can be almost completely isolated from all external
networks, which is also known as “air-gaping” [28]. In such a sce-
nario, malware can still be injected by exploiting hardware/software
backdoors throughout the supply chain. For example, it has been re-
cently reported that some microchips were added to servers’ moth-
erboards during the manufacturing process without the knowledge
of a major server vendor [63]. In other instances, ShadowPad was
implanted into a software program developed by a third-party ven-
dor, affecting hundreds of large businesses [45], while malicious
batteries [53] and other hardware Trojans [76] are all known threats
to data security. An even more striking example is that over 100,000
computers that had never been connected to any network were also
implanted with information-stealing hardware Trojans by using a
classified technology [68].
A complete data exfiltration attack involves two major steps. The
first step is to inject a malware program into the target computer
and collect sensitive information. The second step is to establish
a covert communication channel to send sensitive data to the re-
ceiver. Like the existing covert channel literature [28, 33, 35, 53], our
work focuses on the step of establishing a covert communication
channel. Thus, we can embed NoDE into an existing information-
collecting malware. Concretely, we describe the procedure of in-
tegrating NoDE with malware created by the recently released
malware toolkit L0rdix [2, 46] as follows. The L0rdix toolkit comes
with a variety of pre-built and configurable functionalities. It can
steal information from the victim system by collecting login infor-
mation, browser cookies, and files matching pre-configured exten-
sions. It can also monitor clipboard content to steal data matching
predefined strings. L0rdix toolkit offers botnet capabilities such as
𝑰𝟎 + 𝑰𝟏 
∑𝑰𝒏+ 𝑰𝒓 𝑹 
𝑽𝑺 
𝑹𝒓 
Receiver 
𝑽𝑪 
𝑽𝒓 = 𝑽𝑪 − 𝑰𝒓𝑹𝒓 
= 𝑽𝑺 − ∑𝑰𝒏𝑹 − 𝑰𝒓(𝑹𝒓+𝑹) 
= 𝑽𝑺 − 𝑰𝟎𝑹 − 𝑰𝒏𝑹
𝑵
𝒏=𝟏
− 𝑰𝒓(𝑹𝒓+𝑹) 
𝑰𝟎 𝑰𝟏 
𝑰𝑵 𝑰𝒓 
Voltage at the receiver  
Transmitter 
Figure 3: Illustration of a building’s power network topology
showing possible locations of transmitter and receiver. The
transmitter current I0 is embedded in receiver’s voltage Vr .
opening a specific URL, execute commands, kill processes, upload
and download files and run executable files. L0rdix also comes with
USB infection, mining, detection prevention, anti-analysis, and anti-
VM capabilities as well. In our context, we leverage the malware’s
existing capabilities of system infiltration and information collec-
tion, and utilize its botnet functionality with our covert channel
communication. We can either attach our code with L0rdix malware
or configure L0rdix to download our program as malicious code.
Other malware generators such as Senna Spy FTP, which spread as
a Trojan bundled with free software, can also be used to secretly
download the code of NoDE into an infected system [71, 75].
4 POWER NETWORK AS A COVERT
CHANNEL
In this section, we present our covert channel residing in a building’s
power network.
4.1 Overview of a Building’s Power Network
The utility power typically enters a building through a single
point. Then, through a distribution box, power is split to different
floors/rooms in parallel and finally to different power strips/outlets.
For large buildings, a multi-level distribution hierarchymay be used.
Further, the utility may provide three-phase power to buildings,
and the three phases can be divided depending on functions (e.g.,
offices on one phase, and the central air conditioner on another)
or physical topologies. For illustration, Fig. 3 provides a simplified
example of a single-phase power network of a building, highlight-
ing the parallel connection of different power outlets. The common
source voltage VS enters a distribution/panel box and reduces to
VC due to a voltage drop caused by the line resistance. Then, the
voltage VC is supplied to different rooms/outlets. We can write the
receiver’s voltage signal Vr as
Vr = VC − IrRr = VS − I0R −
N∑
n=1
InR − Ir (R + Rr ), (1)
whereR is the resistance of the common line fromwhich all currents
flow, and Rr is the resistance of the line directly supplying power
to the receiver. Clearly, the receiver’s voltage signal Vr contains
the transmitter’s current denoted by I0 in Fig. 3, whose amplitude
can be modulated by varying the CPU load to carry information
(Section 5.1). Thus, if the receiver is able to extract I0R out of its
signal Vr , it can exfiltrate information from a computer through
the power network.
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Power Supply Unit
Bridge 
Rectifier
Power Factor 
Correction
DC to DC 
Converter
100~240V
AC
~380V
DC
12V
DC
Internal 
Components
EMI
Filter
Figure 4: Components of a desktop computer’s power supply
unit.
4.2 Computer’s Power Supply Unit
We now look at the anatomy of a computer’s power supply unit and
identify an important component — PFC circuit — which generates
high-frequency current ripples that can be detected by the receiver.
4.2.1 Acloser look at computer’s power supply unit. As shown
in Fig. 4, a power supply unit based on the standard SMPS design
draws 100∼240V AC voltage from an outlet and then, after multiple
stages, provides regulated 12V DC voltage to internal components
such as CPU. Specifically, at the front end, there is an EMI filter to
limit frequency components of greater than 150kHz both coming
from and conducted back to the power network, in compliance with
international regulations [17, 39]. Then, a rectifier converts the in-
coming AC voltage to a pulsating DC voltage (unipolar half-sine
waves), followed by a PFC circuit which improves the power factor
by regulating the input current waveform and making it resemble
the entering voltage’s sine wave. Fig. 5(a) shows a snapshot of the
current waveform drawn by our Dell computer with PFC. The PFC
elevates the voltage to around 380V, which is stepped down and
becomes 12V DC voltage for internal components.
Harmonic distortion is undesirable since it reduces the power
factor and causes unwanted power losses in the power system [64].
Low-power devices with SMPS (switch mode power supply) are
allowed to have a low power factor without PFC (see Fig. 22 in
Appendix C.3 for the current waveform). Nonetheless, regardless
of the actual power consumption, all devices with a power rating of
75W (applicable for desktop computers) must have PFC circuits for
mitigating harmonics as mandated by international regulations [18,
43, 64]. Thus, a crucial point we highlight is that the PFC requirement
for mitigating harmonics universally applies to all of today’s desktop
computers.
4.2.2 Frequency spikes generatedbyPFC. As shown in Fig. 5(a),
while improving power factor, the PFC circuit also produces high-
frequency current ripples due to its working principle [64]. Specifi-
cally, the core of a PFC circuit is rapidly switching the incoming
current between two modes — a rising mode where the current
increases, and a falling mode where the current decreases. Through
switching, the current drawn from the power outlet resembles a sine
waveform following the voltage signal. The switching frequency
is determined by a controller as well as the PFC components (e.g.,
inductor), and typically falls into the range of <40kHz, 150kHz>,
which is not subject to EMI regulations that set limits on frequencies
greater than 150kHz [17, 64].
(a) Current waveform (b) Frequency analysis of current
Figure 5: (a) Current drawnby ourDell PowerEdge computer.
(b) The current has a high-frequency spike due to PFC oper-
ation under CCM.
There are three basic modes for PFC switching (a.k.a., conduc-
tion mode) as summarized in Table 4 in Appendix C.1. In practice,
vendors may adopt proprietary designs using variants of the basic
modes [64]. Naturally, the PFC’s switching operation results in
high-frequency current ripples, thus generating a PSD (power spec-
trum density) spike around the switching frequency. Illustrative
current waveforms and frequency analysis results are shown in
Table 4. Note that when PFC is not used, there exist no such PSD
spikes within <40kHz, 150kHz> (see Fig. 22(b)).
Desktop computers’ power supply units almost all have a rated
capacity of over 300W to accommodate extensibility. Thus, the
continuous conduction mode (CCM) is most widely-used due to its
low peak current. We show the current and its frequency analysis
for our Dell computer in Fig. 5. It can be observed that with PFC,
the harmonics are an order of magnitude smaller than the 60Hz
component. Furthermore, the current waveform and frequency
analysis match with those illustrative figures for CCM in Table 4 in
Appendix C.1, clearly showing a prominent high-frequency PSD
spike generated by the PFC circuit.
4.3 Extracting Transmitter’s Current based on
PFC Switching Frequency
The receiver’s voltage signal in Eqn. (1) contains all the frequency
components of the common source voltage and currents of all
connected devices. That is, the high-frequency current ripples gen-
erated by PFC circuits affect voltage signals at any power outlet
within the same power network, which are referred to as switching
noise [64]. Consequently, if we filter out all but the transmitter’s
high-frequency switching noises from the receiver’s voltage Vr ,
we are left with the transmitter’s switching noise around its PFC
frequency and the switching noise amplitude is also highly corre-
lated with the transmitter’s current I0. This is achieved based on
the (approximate) orthogonality of PFC’s switching noises.
Different computers typically have non-overlapping PFC switch-
ing frequencies. In fact, our experiment shows that even for comput-
ers with the same configuration and manufactured by the same ven-
dor, different computers still have (slightly) different PFC switching
frequencies due to manufacturing process variations and can simul-
taneously transmit data without much interference. Furthermore,
the prominent PSD spikes between 40kHz and 150kHz do not inter-
fere significantly with harmonics (predominantly less than 20kHz)
generated by other devices. Therefore, in practice, the ripples in the
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(a) Transmitter’s CPU load and current
amplitude
(b) Frequency analysis of the received
voltage signal
(c) Frequency spectrum of the received
voltage signal
(d) Filtered voltage signal and transmit-
ter’s current
Figure 6: Experiment in Lab #1with transmitter and receiver separated by 55ft. By applying afilterwith passband of <67.28kHz,
67.34kHz>, the amplitude of filtered voltage signals acquired by the receiver matches the transmitter’s current amplitude.
receiver’s voltage signal caused by the target transmitter’s switch-
ing noise do not suffer from significant interferences from other
sources.
We empirically validate the feasibility of extracting the transmit-
ter’s current amplitude information. Our experiment is conducted
in a lab with 30+ computers, where the transmitter and receiver
are plugged into two outlets located about 55 feet away from each
other. The details of the setup are presented in Section 6.1. We
vary the transmitting computer’s current by varying its CPU load
because compared to components such as hard disk and memory
chips, a computer’s CPU has a high dynamic power that can be
easily adjusted by loading/unloading the CPU. Moreover, CPU is
ubiquitously available in all computers and needed by any running
program. As GPUs are power-consuming, a computer’s current can
also be significantly varied in a similar fashion by using increasing
the utilization of a dedicated GPU. Note, however, that a GPU is
less ubiquitous compared to a CPU, especially in ordinary office
environments. Thus, throughout our study, we will only utilize
CPU to change a computer’s current for data exfiltration.
We show in Fig. 6(a) the transmitter’s CPU load and current am-
plitude, which match with each other quite well. Then, we perform
a frequency analysis of the received voltage signal and show the
result in Fig. 6(b). We see large frequency components between
40kHz and 80kHz (and sporadic higher-frequency spikes). These
are mainly due to different computers’ PFC switching operations,
and the components around 67.3kHz are caused by our transmitter.
The temporal variation of the PSD spikes created by the transmitter
is shown in the frequency spectrum in Fig. 6(c) where we can easily
identify the transmitter’s high current periods. Next, we filter the
collected voltage signal with a passband of <67.28kHz, 67.34kHz>
and show the filtered voltage signal in Fig. 6(d) where the filtered
voltage signal resembles the current ripples (as shown in the zoom-
in window). The filtered voltage amplitude is close to zero during
the low current periods because the PSD spikes shifts away from
the 60Hz passband.
In summary, we have demonstrated that, with a proper band-
pass filter, the amplitude of the receiver’s filtered voltage signal can
recover the transmitter’s modulated current amplitude and hence be
exploited for demodulation.
(a) CPU load increase (b) CPU load decrease
Figure 7: Input current’s response to CPU load changes. Due
to power supply unit’s internal control, the current does not
change immediately after change in the CPU load.
5 THE DESIGN OF NODE
In this section, we present the design of NoDE. As shown in Fig. 8,
NoDE includes both a transmitter (i.e., a desktop computer with im-
planted malware) and a receiver (i.e., any voltage-collecting device
plugged into a power outlet).
5.1 Transmitter Design
Like in the prior literature on covert channels [28, 29, 73], NoDE
focuses on the physical process of data exfiltration — converting 1/0
bits into current amplitudes and decoding it from a remote outlet.
That is, the implanted malware already collects needed information
(Section 3) and encodes it into 1/0 bit streams that are ready for data
framing and modulation. Next, we address the key design issues.
5.1.1 Choosing symbol rate. NoDEmodulates the transmitter’s
current amplitude by varying the CPU load based on 1/0 bit values.
Thus, the achievable symbol rate crucially depends on how fast the
current amplitude changes in response to the CPU load. While the
CPU usage can be adjusted within a millisecond or even faster [60],
the current drawn by a computer may not instantly follow (i.e., lags)
the CPU usage. In our experiment with a Dell PowerEdge computer
in Fig. 7(a) shows that the current takes about 20∼30 milliseconds to
reach the peak after jump in the CPU load at around 50 milliseconds.
In addition, because of the feedback control adopted by a power
supply unit, a sudden CPU load change can create a current inrush
followed by a current dip. As shown in Fig. 7(b) , the current also
lags by around 30 milliseconds when the CPU load sharply changes
from high to low.
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Figure 8: Block diagramof transmitter and receiver inNoDE. The transmitter sends data to the receiver over the power network.
(a) Symbol length = 33ms (b) Symbol length = 66ms (c) Symbol length = 100ms
Figure 9: Experiments for 2 bits per symbol on our Dell Pow-
erEdge computer. With a symbol length of 100ms, there is
sufficient time for the input current to steadily respond to
CPU load changes.
Based on our experiment results, we choose 33ms as the default
symbol duration. This means that, by modulating the transmitter’s
current amplitude, the achievable symbol rate in NoDE is 30 symbols
per second.
5.1.2 Choosing modulation mode. For a fixed symbol rate, a
higher bit rate can be achieved if each symbol carries more bits.
Here, we run experiments to see how many bits can be successfully
mapped into each symbol: 2N discrete current/power levels are
needed for N bits per symbol. For N = 2, we vary CPU loads at
four levels (0%, 25%, 75% and 100%, representing “00”, “01”, “10” and
“11”, respectively) and see how input current changes, given three
different symbol lengths — 33ms, 66ms, and 100ms.
We show the results in Fig. 9 and see that when each symbol
lasts 33ms, there is a mismatch between the CPU load (representing
2 digital bits) and the resulting current amplitude, thus clearly lead-
ing to a very high symbol error rate. As explained in Section 5.1.1,
this mismatch is mainly due to the complex feedback control mech-
anisms and large capacitors inside a computer’s power supply unit.
If the symbol length increases to 66ms, there is still insufficient
time for the current amplitude to yield a steady response. The cur-
rent amplitude correlates well with the CPU load when the symbol
length increases to 100ms, but this means that the effective bit rate
is only 20 bits/second, which is even lower than 30 bits/second
achieved by a binary modulation with a symbol length of 33ms.
With N > 2 bits per symbol, there is an even poorer correlation
between the CPU load and input current, unless the symbol length
is sufficiently large.
As a result, we choose binary modulation and use high and low
currents to represent “1” and “0”, respectively. Concretely, we build
upon the existing literature [34, 73] and design a simple current
modulator as described in Algorithm 3 in Appendix D. The current
modulator program takes 1/0 bit information as the input and runs
some dummy calculations (e.g., generating random numbers) to
load the CPU and change the computer’s input current.
5.1.3 Choosing the frame length. Like in many communica-
tions systems [25], NoDE groups 1/0 bit sequences into frames,
each beginning with a pilot sequence (Section 5.1.4). As shown in
Fig. 8, following the pilot symbols is the actual payload that contains
uncoded bits or coded bits using error correction techniques.
In our context, the transmitter’s PFC switching frequency is
unknown to the receiver and may vary over time, albeit slowly.
Throughout each frame, however, the transmitter’s PFC switching
frequency should remain relatively constant. As shown in the cu-
mulative density function (CDF) and the frequency spectrum in
Fig. 21, the PFC switching frequency does not vary by more than
50Hz within 5 seconds. On the other hand, for a good bit detection,
the receiver’s frequency band for filtering voltage signals can be
only 60Hz. Thus, we conservatively choose a frame length of 100
symbols, resulting in frame duration of 3.3 seconds.
5.1.4 Choosing pilot symbols. In wireless communications, pi-
lot symbols are symbols mutually known to both the transmitter
and receiver and inserted at the beginning of each frame, allowing
the receiver to estimate the channel state and synchronize data
reception [25]. In our context, pilot symbols are needed by the
receiver to identify the transmitter’s signals and the start of a data
frame (details in Section 5.2). Nonetheless, the length of a pilot se-
quence needs to be properly chosen. A too short sequence may not
be enough for the attacker to accurately acquire the transmitter’s
PFC switching frequency, whereas a too long sequence takes up an
unnecessarily high overhead. In our experiments in Section 6.2.3,
we find that a 6-bit pilot sequence (“110010” in our study) strikes a
good balance, while we also examine 4-bit and 8-bit pilot sequences
(Table 1). Note that, for some scenarios (e.g., when there are multi-
ple transmitting computers), a longer pilot sequence may be needed
to uniquely identify each transmitting computer and better locate
the corresponding frequency band. However, in general, there is no
need to change the pilot sequence for different buildings or power
suppliers.
To summarize, considering the hardware constraints and behav-
ior of the PFC switching frequency, we choose in our default design
a symbol period of 33 milliseconds, 1 bit per symbol, 100 bits in
each data frame with a frame duration of 3.3 seconds, and a 6-bit
pilot sequence “110010”.
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Algorithm 1 Finding a Passband for Filtering Voltage Signals
1: Input: Voltage signal V (t) of a pilot length, symbol length Tb ,
pilot sequence Bp , max window Fmax kHz, increment Finc kHz
2: for lb =20 ∼ (150-Fmax) kHz with increment Finc do
3: for ub = lb + Finc ∼ lb + Fmax with increment Finc do
4: V˜ (t)lb,ub ← V (t)<lb,ub> //filtering
5: E(t)lb,ub ← Envelop of V˜ (t)lb,ub
6: Extract bits B∗ from E(t)lb,ub based on Tb
7: Error vector err(t)lb,ub ← B∗ XOR Bp
8: end for
9: end for
10: if err(t)lb,ub == 0 then //pilot sequence found
11: Return < lb,ub >
12: end if
5.2 Receiver Design
On the receiver side, NoDE calculates the average amplitude of
filtered voltage signals for every bit length and compares it against
a detection threshold for deciding a 1/0 bit value. There are three
major steps: (1) finding a passband for the filter; (2) identifying the
start of a data frame; and (3) demodulating the extracted signals
into 1/0 data bits.
5.2.1 Finding the filter’s passband. In practice, the transmit-
ter’s PFC switching frequency is unknown to the receiver. Based on
a predetermined pilot sequence, we propose a scanning process to
find a frequency passband for filtering received voltage signals and
retaining the prominent PSD spikes generated by the transmitter.
The scanning process is described in Algorithm 1, where two nested
loops scan through the frequency bands from 20 kHz to 150 kHz
with a moving window of variable size. The notion of < lb,ub >
means a band-pass filter with lb and ub being the lower and up-
per cutoff frequencies, respectively. When < lb,ub > appears as a
subscript, it means that a signal passes through a band-pass filter
< lb,ub >.
In each inner loop, the amplitude/envelop of filtered voltage
signal is extracted and then evenly sliced into bit-length pieces.
Then, the average amplitude for each piece is used for deciding
binary bit values. Specifically, we set the the mean of bit-wise
average amplitudes of the filtered signal as the binary bit decision
threshold: a bit-wise average amplitude higher than the threshold is
decoded as “1”, and “0” otherwise. Then, by comparing the extracted
bits with the pilot sequence, we return the passband that yields no
errors for pilot detection.
As the PFC switching frequency does not vary significantly over
time, we only need to scan through a wide frequency range (e.g.,
from 20kHz to 150kHz) once. After the initial scan, the receiver only
needs to quickly fine tune its filter’s passband over a much narrower
range (e.g., 500Hz around the previously-found passband, instead of
20kHz to 150kHz) to compensate for runtime switching frequency
offsets. Moreover, provided that voltage signals are acquired and
stored, bit extraction can be done offline, and hence the scanning
complexity is not an issue. In fact, with Finc = 0.01kHz, Algorithm 1
only takes less than 5 minutes in Matlab on a laptop.
Algorithm 2 Identifying Frame Start and Bit Threshold
1: Input: Pilot length Tp , bit length Tb , pilot sequence Bp
2: loop at current time t
3: Obtain filtered voltage V˜ (t , t −Tp )
4: E(t , t −Tp ) ← Signal envelop of V˜ (t , t −Tp )
5: Extract bits B∗ from E(t , t −Tp ) based on Tb
6: Error vector err(t) ← B∗ XOR Bp //bit-wise
7: if err(t) == 0 then //pilot sequence found
8: Return payload starting time t , and bit detection thresh-
old (average of E(t , t −Tp ))
9: end if
10: end loop
5.2.2 Identifying the start of a frame. While the filter’s pass-
band does not vary significantly due to the slow variation of PFC
switching frequencies, the bit detection threshold depends on the
non-controllable environment (e.g., other computers with similar
PFC switching frequencies can cause interferences) and hence can
change quickly at runtime. We propose a time-domain scanning
process to identify the bit detection threshold and start of each data
frame based on the predetermined pilot sequence. The scanning
process is presented in Algorithm 2.
5.2.3 Extracting data bits. After identifying a pilot sequence,
the receiver can extract actual payload bits using the bit detection
threshold returned by Algorithm 2: if a bit-wise average ampli-
tude of the filtered signal is higher than the threshold, then the
corresponding payload bit is decided as “1”, and “0” otherwise.
6 EVALUATION
This section presents experiment results to validate the practical
feasibility of NoDE, highlighting that NoDE achieves an effective
rate of up to 28.48 bits/second to a receiver located in another room
about 90 feet (≈ 27.4 meters) away.
6.1 Methodology
Experiment setup. As listed in Table 2, we test seven computers
with different operating systems/configurations, including four
recently purchased from two top vendors (Dell and Acer) which
collectively account for more than 25% of the global PC market
share [42], an iMac (27 inch), and two custom-built computers
with top-brand power supply units (Corsair and EVGA). They all
have CCM type PFC in their power supply units. Our collection of
desktops is representative of commonly used models in our target
case of modern enterprise office setup.
These computers are located in four different labs/offices in two
different buildings (referred to as A and B, respectively). As our de-
fault location, Lab #1 in Building A is a large shared lab space hous-
ing about 30 students with 30+ active desktop computers, where
the transmitter’s and receiver’s power outlets are approximately 55
feet away from each other. Thus, Lab #1 represents an environment
with high power line noises. The layout of Lab #1 is illustrated in
Fig. 10. In addition, we also run experiments in another two labs (#2
with about 10 students and #3 with about 15 students) in Building A.
Our experiment setup in Building B is illustrated in Fig. 14, where
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Figure 10: Experiment setup at Lab #1 in Building A. 1○
Transmitter. 2○ Power strip. 3○ADC for voltage signal acqui-
sition (oscilloscope in our experiments). 4○ Laptop for volt-
age filtering and bit detection. 5○ Receiver’s power outlet.
the transmitter and receiver are located in two different rooms
about 90 feet away from each other.
Transmitted data. Like other studies on covert channels [28,
29, 73], NoDE focuses on stealthy exfiltration of already collected
information. Thus, for illustration, we use 8-bit ASCII values of the
string “password123” followed by six random bits as the payload
data and “110010” as the 6-bit pilot sequence. Each frame has 100
bits. We also randomly generate 50 data frames for each experi-
ment. Each symbol carries one bit and lasts 33ms. Like the existing
covert channel literature, error correction coding is orthogonal and
omitted in our experiments.
Current amplitude modulation. To modulate the current am-
plitude (Section 5.1.2), we implement a current modulator following
Algorithm 3 which can be incorporated into existing malware for
data exfiltration. The program is written in Java and uses multiple
nested sin() and cos() computations on a random floating number
to vary the CPU load.We use multi-threading to increase the impact
on the CPU. However, as the default case, we do not use any CPU
pinning and allow regular OS scheduling.
Voltage measurement. To collect voltage signals, we use a
Rigol 1074z oscilloscope as a proxy ADC circuit. To remove the
voltage’s dominant 60Hz component and improve the signal ac-
quisition precision, we follow [20] and insert a RC high-pass filter
with ∼10kHz cutoff frequency between the power outlet and the
oscilloscope. We use 500 kilo-samples per seconds (kSa/s) as the
default sampling rate. While we use a bulky oscilloscope for con-
venience, the receiver only needs to hide a small ADC circuit (e.g.,
using ATmega Microcontroller) to acquire and digitize the voltage
signal (Section 3).
Frequency analysis and filters. We use Matlab to perform
Fourier analysis and signal filtering. In real-world implementation,
the receiver may also use a digital signal processing chip to filter
voltage signals and demodulate bit values in real time.
Metrics. We calculate the bit error rate (i.e., percentage of bit
errors) and effective transmission rate measured in bits/second (i.e.,
actual payload bit rate, excluding pilot symbols and erroneous bits).
We also list in Table 2 the distance between the transmitter’s and
receivers’ power outlets.
6.2 Evaluation Results
We now present our evaluation results, highlighting that NoDE
achieves stealthy data exfiltration from desktop computers. We first
present a snapshot of data exfiltration using NoDE followed by the
case where four transmitters are simultaneously sending data to a
single receiver. We then evaluateNoDE under different background
applications, different numbers of CPU cores used by NoDE, and
different pilot lengths. We also test how the CPU states affectNoDE,
and the effectiveness of NoDE in data exfiltration without a line
of sight. Finally, we present results with computers from different
manufacturers.
6.2.1 A snapshot of data exfiltration. We show in Fig. 11 the
different stages ofNoDE for data exfiltration from our Dell Optiplex
computer with 4 CPU cores. For clarity, we only show the first 50
bits in a data frame. At the top, we show the frame bits with the pilot
sequence highlighted in a gray shade. The “X”s prior to the pilot
sequence indicate “no data”. Also, the time index “0” indicates the
start of the frame. We then show the transmitter’s current, which
is modulated by varying the CPU load. We can see that the current
amplitude changes with the transmitted bits.
Then, we show the receiver’s unfiltered voltage signal, which
is affected by grid voltage variations as well as all other loads
sharing the same power network and hence barely reveals any
useful information. Next, we show the filtered voltage signal with
a passband of <67.28 kHz, 67.34 kHz> identified by Algorithm 1.
The envelop/amplitude of the filtered voltage signal is extracted,
and then the average amplitude is used for bit detection. From
the pilot sequence, we identify the frame’s starting point and set
the bit detection threshold accordingly (Algorithm 2). The bit-wise
average amplitudes are then demodulated into the received bits —
an average amplitude above the detection threshold is considered as
“1”, and “0” otherwise. In this experiment, the received bits perfectly
match the transmitted bits without any errors, resulting an effective
payload bit rate of 28.48 bits/second.
6.2.2 Simultaneous transmissions . We simultaneously usemul-
tiple computers as transmitters to demonstrate that the PSD spikes
from different computers do not interfere with each other. We con-
duct this experiment in Lab#1 using three Dell OptiPlex desktops
with identical power supply units and one Dell XPS desktop with
a different supply unit. Note that, while we use four computers as
transmitters, there are other computers (30+) in the building that
also generate switching noise spikes due to their PFC circuits.
Fig. 12 shows the frequency spectrum of the voltage signal from
the receiver while the corresponding data frame extractions are
shown in Appendix E.2. In the top figure, we show the frequency
spectrum of the three transmitters with identical power supply units
whose PSD spikes are close to each other (within the frequency
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Figure 11: Dell Optiplex computer: A snapshot of data exfiltration. The receiver’s voltage signal is filtered with a passband of
<67.28kHz, 67.34kHz> and the bit-wise average amplitudes of filtered voltage signals reveal the transmitted bits.
TX#2
TX#3
TX#4
TX#1
Figure 12: Four transmitters (TX#1∼4) simultaneously send-
ing data to a single receiver. Bit error rates of TX#1, TX#2,
TX#3, and TX#4 are 0.0%, 6.8%, 1.1%, and 0.0%, respectively.
The higher bit error rate for TX#2 is due to the partial over-
lap with TX#1.
band <66.6kHz, 67.6kHz>). The bottom figure shows the frequency
spectrum of the other transmitter which generates PSD spikes
around 60.1kHz. Each transmitter sends a single data frame at
different times. We can clearly identify the data frames of the four
transmitters in the frequency spectra. We use four 60Hz band-
pass filters with center frequencies 60.13kHz, 67.09kHz, 67.3kHz,
and 66.72kHz to extract the transmitted data frames. As shown in
Appendix E.2, we achieve data exfiltration with a maximum bit
error rate less than 7% for any transmitter.
6.2.3 Data exfiltrationunder different settings. Now,we vary
the default settings listed in Section 6.1. The results are summarized
in Table 1, while the figures are shown in Appendix E.1.
First, we run a concurrent program by playing “See You Again”
on YouTube on a Google Chrome browser, which is one of the most
viewed videos [62]. As video streaming can be fairly CPU intensive1,
running YouTube adds random variations to the transmitter’s power.
1Our test desktop does not have a dedicated GPU to offload video processing.
Table 1: Summary of Data Exfiltration from Dell Optiplex
Scenario Bit ErrorRate
Bits Per
Second
Detection
Results
Default (4 cores) 0.0% 28.48 Fig. 11
With YouTube streaming 2.3% 27.82 Fig. 27(a)
With MS Word running 0% 28.48 Fig. 27(b)
With web browsing 0% 28.48 Fig. 27(c)
With HDD file transfer 3.5% 27.48 Fig. 27(d)
With ML training 1.67% 28.00 Fig. 27(e)
Loading 1 CPU core 8.9% 25.94 Fig. 28(a)
Loading 2 CPU cores 2.5% 27.77 Fig. 28(b)
Loading 3 CPU cores 0.0% 28.48 Fig. 28(c)
Using 4-bit pilot sequence 3.3% 28.13 Fig. 29(a)
Using 8-bit pilot sequence 0.0% 27.88 Fig. 29(b)
It also reduces the difference between transmitted "0"s and "1"s,
resulting in a 2.3% bit error rate. We also run experiments using MS
Word, web browsing, file transfer, and machine learning training
as background applications resulting in 0%, 0%, 3.5%, and 1.67% bit
error rates, respectively. In the MS word experiment, we mimic user
behavior by repeatedly opening a new file, typing a few lines of texts
and then saving the file. For the web browsing experiment, we open
new popular websites (e.g., GMail and Facebook), scroll through the
page content, and follow links to other pages. For the file transfer
experiment, we transfer a 5GB file from one HDD drive to another
in our desktop computer running Windows 10. For the machine
learning experiment, we repeat training Tensorflow in Python with
6000 samples from the MNIST data set taking around fives minutes
to finish [52]. From the results from Table 1 we see that under
a diverse set of background applications running simultaneously,
NoDE still maintains a low bit error rate.
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(a) Transmitter power consumption (b) NoDE’s data exfiltration accuracy
Figure 13: The impact of CPU power state on the bit er-
ror rate of NoDE and the transmitter’s (Dell Optiplex com-
puter) power consumption. In our Dell Optiplex, 10% and
100% CPU states correspond to CPU frequencies of 0.79GHz
and 3.68GHz, respectively.
Second, we use CPU pinning to restrict the number of cores
that are assigned to the modulation program in NoDE. Reducing
number of cores increases the bit error rate because it limits how
much the modulation program can vary the transmitter’s current.
Nonetheless, we find that even by loading only one CPU core (the
weakest transmission), NoDE achieves an effective rate of 25.94
bits/second. In Table 1 we omit the four core case which is our
default case with 0% bit error rate.
Finally, we consider 4-bit (“1101”) and 8-bit (“11001010”) pilot
sequences. We see that when using a 4-bit pilot sequence “1101”,
the bit detection threshold may not be properly set due to lack of
enough pilot symbols, but it has lower overhead than the 8-bit pilot
and NoDE still achieves 28.13 bits/second.
6.2.4 Impact of CPU scaling on the transmitter. We tune the
CPU scaling of the transmitter by changing the “maximum proces-
sor state” in the Windows power management system. We vary
the maximum processor state from 10% to 100% which, in our test
computer, corresponds to CPU frequency from 0.79 GHz to 3.68
GHz. We use the default settings and transmit 100 frames under
each different CPU scaling and record the average power consump-
tion of the transmitter using a WattsUp power meter. Figs. 13(a)
and 13(b) show the bit error rates and power consumption for the
different CPU scaling. Similar to our experiment with the number of
cores for NoDE, we see a higher bit error rate when the transmitter
consumes less power due to reduced CPU speed. Note that, While
dynamic CPU scaling at runtime is supported by modern CPUs,
it is more commonly applied in data centers with sophisticated
power-performance control, where energy saving is a crucial con-
cern. For typical enterprise environments, DVFS is not applied and
instead, desktop computers commonly run at the high-performance
mode (i.e., 100% maximum processor state, which is also the default
setting in Windows 10).
6.2.5 Data exfiltration without line of sight. As shown in
Fig. 14, we run an experiment in Building B where the transmitter
and receiver are plugged into two outlets located in two different
rooms which are approximately 90 feet away from each other. We
use a Dell PowerEdge computer as the transmitter which, albeit us-
ing a different switching frequency, adopts same PFC design as our
Dell Optiplex computer. We show a snapshot of extracted signals
at the receiver in Fig. 32 in Appendix E.4. We see that, compared to
Corridor
~90 Feet
1 2
ReceiverTransmitter
2
1
Figure 14: Experiment setup in Building B. 1○ Transmitter’s
room. 2○Receiver’s room. No line of sight between the trans-
mitter and the receiver.
Fig. 11, the distinction between bit “1” and bit “0” in terms of the
average amplitude of filtered voltage is less significant. Nonetheless,
even with a transmitter-receiver distance of 90 feet and across differ-
ent rooms, NoDE still achieves error-free stealthy data exfiltration
with a rate of 28.48 bits/second.
6.2.6 Data exfiltration fromother computers. To further eval-
uateNoDE, we run more experiments on four additional computers:
an Apple iMac, an Acer, and two custom-built systems with top-
brand power supply units (Corsair and EVGA). These computers
are located in different labs in Building A. For the iMac, we could
achieve a maximum of 15.79 bits/second due the iMac’s slow re-
sponse to power change and wider frequency signature (discussed
further in Appendix E.6). We summarize our results in Table 2,
while the details are presented in Appendices E.5 and E.6.
In summary, while certain conditions may degrade the effective-
ness of NoDE, our experiments on different computers and under
different settings confirm that NoDE can exploit a building’s power
network as a covert channel for stealthy data exfiltration from
desktop computers without using a conventional communication
network.
6.3 Discussions
We now discuss NoDE from the following important aspects.
Comparison with PLC adapters.Without dedicated physical
powerline communications (PLC) adapters, NoDE still achieves in-
formation transfer over power networks. This is due to the PFC’s ca-
pability of generating prominent high-frequency quasi-orthogonal
switching noises. During our experiments, we have found that
the amplitudes of PFC-induced switching noise spikes and high-
frequency voltage signals (in MHz range) modulated by a PLC
adapter (NETGEAR PowerLINE 1000) are in the same order of
magnitude. Thus, in practice, the achievable transmission range of
NoDE is expected to be similar to that of a PLC adapter (typically
up to a few tens of meters) [7].
Missed frames and bits. In any covert channels [29, 35, 73],
some frames may not be successfully received due to erroneous
pilot and/or payload symbols, and the receiver is not able to notify
the transmitter due to the unidirectional covert channel. To trade
efficiency for reliability, the transmitter may send each data frame
multiple times and/or apply error correction coding [25].
Higher bit rate and limit. Like in the existing power-based
data exfiltration literature [35, 73], we empirically demonstrate the
achievable bit rate of NoDE. Nonetheless, we provide conjectures
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Table 2: Summary of Experiments on Seven Different Computers.
Transmitting
Computer Configuration
Operating
System
Power Supply
Unit Year
PFC
Switching
Frequency
Location TX-RXDistance
Bit
Error
Rate
Bits
Per
Second
Detection
Results
Dell Optiplex
9020
Core i7-4790,
16 GB Windows 10
Dell-L290EM-01 300W
by Lite-on Tech. Co. 2015 ∼67.3 kHz
Lab #1
(Building A) ∼55 feet 0.0% 28.48 Fig. 11
Dell PowerEdge
R630
Dual Xeon
E52640, 32GB
Ubuntu
Server 14.04
Dell-E495E-S1 495W
by Astek Intl. 2016 ∼65.8 kHz
Office
(Building B) ∼90 feet 0.0% 28.48 Fig. 32
Dell XPS
8920
Core i7-7700,
16 GB Windows 10
Dell-460AM-03 385W
by Delta Electronics Inc. 2017 ∼60.1 kHz
Lab #1
(Building A) ∼55 feet 0.0% 28.48 Fig. 30(d)
Acer G3-710 Core i7-7700,16 GB
Ubuntu
16.04 ACER 750W 2016 ∼63.5 kHz
Lab #2
(Building A) ∼20 feet 10.1% 25.60 Fig. 33(a)
Custom
Built #1
Core i7-7700,
16GB Windows 10
Corsair 850W
RM850x-RPS0110 2018 ∼91.2 kHz
Lab #1
(Building A) ∼55 feet 8.1% 26.17 Fig. 33(b)
Custom
Built #2
Core i7-7700K,
16 GB
Ubuntu
16.04
EVGA 850W
Supernova 850G2 2016 ∼67.7 kHz
Lab #3
(Building A) ∼15 feet 9.2% 25.85 Fig. 33(c)
Apple iMac
Model A1419
(27-inch)
Core i5-3470S,
8 GB
macOS
10.13.3
Apple 300W
PA13112A1
(for 2012-2017 models)
2015 ∼101 kHz Lab #1(Building A) ∼55 Feet
16%
(50ms/sym) 15.79 Fig. 34
2%
(100ms/sym) 9.21
on two possible approaches to further improving the achievable
bit rate for data exfiltration. First, we may possibly improve the
achievable bit rate if privileged access to the target computer’s PFC
is granted. Specifically, the PFC’s feedback gain may be altered
to increase the responsiveness of the power supply unit, i.e., the
power supply unit follows changes in the CPU utilization/power
consumption more closely. This can be achievable since most mod-
ern computer power supplies utilize digital control to adjust the
feedback gain [64, 74]. Second, given privileged access to the com-
puter’s power supply unit, another complementary approach is
to modulate the PFC’s switching frequency for data exfiltration.
The digitally-controlled PFC circuit allows dynamically setting the
switching frequency through its control program [81]. However,
this approach may still be restricted by how often we can change
the switching frequency. Moreover, frequency modulation requires
wider bandwidth and hence can be susceptible to greater interfer-
ences from other devices/computers.
Sources of bit errors. Various factors can introduce bit errors
during data exfiltration, including the source signal strength (af-
fected by the amount of transmitter’ power consumption that can
be modulated by the malware and the PFC design), signal propa-
gation path and fading (affected by the relative location/distance
of transmitter and receiver, line impedance, building’s power net-
work topology), interferences from other devices with similar PFC
switching frequencies, among others. While it is challenging, if not
impossible, to theoretically quantify the impact of different factors
on the resulting bit errors for a given transmitter-receiver pair, one
can qualitatively conclude based on standard bit error analysis for
additive white-Gaussian noise channels [25] that a lower bit error
rate can be achieved by increasing the source signal strength, reduc-
ing the signal propagation fading, and/or mitigating interferences.
These are also reflected by our above empirical results.
Scalability of NoDE. The scalability of the simultaneous exfil-
tration depends largely on whether or not switching noise spikes
generated by different computers overlap with each other. Next, we
discuss the following three different cases — orthogonal switching
noises spikes, overlapping switching noise spikes, and practical
scenarios.
•When switching noise spikes of different computers are perfectly
frequency-orthogonal. In this case, data exfiltrations from differ-
ent transmitting computers can be viewed as independent, with-
out much inference from each other. If we conservatively assume
that the switching noise spike of a computer occupies a frequency
band of 500Hz (400Hz sidelobes around the most prominent spike
plus 100Hz guard band) and that the noise spikes of all transmit-
ting computers are perfectly frequency-orthogonal, then NoDE can
achieve simultaneous data exfiltrations from up to 200 computers
over the frequency range of 50–150kHz, which is the range for
typical switching frequencies of PFC circuits [64].
• When switching noise spikes of different computers are over-
lapping in frequencies. In this case, simultaneous data exfiltrations
become challenging, as in the case of any communications systems
[25]. Thus, different transmitting computers need to access the
covert channel at different times. This is not restrictive, since a
target computer may not be always sending data over our covert
channel.
• Practical scenario. In practice, the likelihood of overlapping
PFC-induced noise spikes is not very high because the switching
frequency is not tightly regulated in the power supplies. Thus,
under a scale of up to a few tens of computers, we expect that the
switching noise spikes of some computers may partially overlap,
while most noise spikes do not overlap (Fig. 12). If other background
computers have overlapping switching noise spikes with a target
computer, their switching noises can be viewed as quasi-static
background noises and do not significantly affect data exfiltrations
from the target computer. For example, even on a single computer
with simultaneous background applications, we show in Table 1
that NoDE still can successfully exfiltrate data.
To summarize, the likelihood of having overlapping PFC-induced
noise spikes among two computers is not very high in practice, thus
allowing simultaneous data exfiltrations. Nonetheless, when two
or more target computers have the overlapping switching noise
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Figure 15: Possible defense mechanisms to prevent PFC
switching noise from entering the power network. (a) Pow-
ering a computer through aUPS. (b) Adding power line noise
filters.
spikes, they need to transmit information at different times using
NoDE.
7 DEFENSE MECHANISM
Three major approaches exist to defend againstNoDE— eliminating
PFC-induced switching noises, preventing the switching noises
entering the power network, and suppressing malware activities.
The first two approaches involve hardware implementation and/or
modification, while the last approach can be implemented primarily
in software.
7.1 Eliminating PFC-induced Switching Noises
Completely eliminating PFC noise would require re-designing of
computers’ power supply units with fundamentally different PFC
strategy. However, it is non-trivial to find alternative solutions to
replace the existing mature designs of power supply units with-
out compromising energy efficiency. Moreover, such a change will
require an industry-wide upgrade which is not likely to occur any-
time soon. Alternatively, a stricter EMI regulation can be imposed
to include components less than 150kHz.
7.2 Preventing Switching Noise From Entering
Power Networks
An intuitive defense against NoDE is to power a computer through
a UPS instead of directly connecting it to a power outlet, and thereby
restricting the PFC noise from entering the power network. In such
a case, as shown in Fig.15(a), the UPS sits between the desktop
power supply and the power outlet (i.e., power network). How-
ever, an UPS does not necessarily provide electrical isolation from
the power network. Instead, it “bypasses” the utility power to its
connected devices during normal operation. The UPS acts as an
alternate power source when the power supplied through the utility
is interrupted in the event of voltage drop or complete power losses.
To illustrate this, we connect our Dell PowerEdge computer to a
600VA CyberPower UPS and conduct our data exfiltration experi-
ment in Building B. As shown in Fig. 35, we have “zero” bit error,
which matches our previous experiments without the UPS. Hence,
an UPS-powered computer does not necessarily mean it is immune
to the threat of NoDE, let alone the added UPS cost.
Another defense is to insert a power line noise filters between
computers and power outlets, as shown in Fig. 15(b). The filters
are commercially available to use together with household/office
appliances for reducing interference and better facilitating power
line communications. However, they mainly reduce the amplitude
of appliance-generated noise entering the power network, without
complete elimination. To demonstrate this, we run an experiment
on our Dell PowerEdge computer plugged into a power line noise
filter (X10 XPPF [78]) in Building B. The resulting received signal
is shown in Fig. 36, from which we see that the signal amplitude of
the PFC-induced switching noise spike is degraded by more than a
factor of 10 compared to the case without any filters (Fig. 32). Thus,
while not entirely prohibiting the transmitter’s switching noise
spikes from entering the power network, the power line noise filter
can significantly attenuate the amplitude of spikes, reducing the
effective transmission distance.
7.3 Suppressing Malware Activities
As data exfiltration is done by varying the CPU load to modulate the
transmitter’s overall power consumption, a possible defense is to
randomly vary the CPU load to de-correlate the overall power con-
sumption with information bits. In the prior literature, hardware-
based techniques have been developed to randomize the power
consumption and obfuscate the power signature of instructions
executed in devices [3, 16, 27, 61]. While they are efficient in terms
of the power overhead for randomization, such hardware-based
techniques are typically tailored for devices with specific functions
such as cryptography and not suitable for commodity processors.
On the other hand, power randomization can also be achieved by
software-based approaches.
Concretely, we evaluate software-based approaches for power
randomizationwith two different implementations—RandomNoise
and RandomPower. In RandomNoise, we design a program that
launches CPU-intensive computations at random times to add ran-
dom power consumption. In RandomPower, we follow the state-
of-the-art technique to randomize the overall power consumption
using a feedback loop [67]. As illustrated in Fig. 16, RandomPower
samples the CPU power and uses combinations of CPU speed scal-
ing (DVFS) and CPU-intensive computation to find-tune the power
to follow the random pattern generator. The key difference between
these two approaches is that RandomNoise mainly adds random
power noise to the existing power consumption patterns, whereas
RandomPower randomizes the overall power by more proactively
controlling the CPU.
RandomNoise. We test NoDE’s performance under varying set-
tings of RandomNoise’s time interval of added CPU loads, percent
time of high CPU load, and the number of CPU cores used. Fig. 17(a)
shows NoDE’s bit error rates as we increase the percent time of
high CPU load from 10% to 90% for three different loading intervals
(15/33/66 milliseconds). We see a general trend that, regardless of
the interval length, an increasing percentage of CPU high load af-
fects NoDE more. We also see that 15 milliseconds loading interval
is worse than both 33 and 66 milliseconds intervals because it does
not create a sustained high CPU load. On the other hand, we see
from Fig. 17(b) that loading more CPU cores by RandomNoise also
increases NoDE’s bit error rate.
RandomPower. We implement RandomPower in Ubuntu and
use Intel RAPL interface for sampling the power [47, 65], cpufreq
for DVFS [5], and repeated floating-point operations as CPU-intensive
computation.Whilewe implementRandomPower on Linux, software-
based power monitoring and DVFS in other systems (e.g., Windows)
are also available [5, 9, 10, 47]. In our experiment, the target power
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Figure 16: The building blocks of RandomPower which defends against NoDE by randomizing the computer’s power consump-
tion.
(a) Different CPU loading intervals (b) Different numbers of CPU cores
Figure 17: (a) and (b) Impact of RandomNoise on NoDE’s bit
error rate for different settings.
is determined by random numbers generated following a Gaussian
distribution where we discard values smaller than 0 and greater
than 1, resulting in a truncated Gaussian distribution. The values of
0 and 1 corresponding to 35W and 85W in our experiment, respec-
tively. The mean and variance are user-set inputs to RandomPower,
and the resulting probability density function can be expressed as
f (x ; µ,σ ) =

1
Φ(µ,σ )σ√2π e
−( x−µσ )2 , if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
0, otherwise,
(2)
where Φ(µ,σ ) = 1
σ
√
2π
∫ 1
0 e
−( x−µσ )2dx , µ is the mean, and σ is the
standard deviation of the untruncated Gaussian distribution. Based
on the feedback, the CPU control block sets the appropriate CPU
speed using DVFS and the amount of CPU-intensive workload to
follow the randomly set power consumption target. In Fig. 18, we
show a snapshot of the random number sequence and correspond-
ing power consumption of RandomPower running with a mean
of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.5 for a truncated Gaussian
distribution. We update the randomly set target power every 40 mil-
liseconds. We see that the power consumption closely follows the
supplied random number withminor deviations at times mainly due
to the computer power supply’s internal controls. While we use a
truncated Gaussian distribution, this approach can be adopted with
other probability distributions. In our evaluation, RandomPower
works perfectly against NoDE, and we cannot even identify the
pilot sequence to extract the transmitted bits.
Overhead. Both RandomNoise and RandomPower add over-
head to the system to defend. Since RandomNoise injects random
power noise, it results in additional power consumption by the
computer. To have a detailed view of RandomNoise’s overhead,
we show the power overhead under different cases in Fig. 19(a)
Figure 18: Illustration of the power variation following the
target random number with a 0.5 mean and 0.5 standard de-
viation.
with the 15-millisecond results as outliers. We calculate the power
overhead by running RandomNoise without any transmission and
subtracting the idle power (∼28W) from the average power con-
sumption. The key message from Fig. 19(a) is that RandomNoise
can significantly affect NoDE’s performance (> 30% bit error rate)
when it injects more than 20W of random power consumption.
Nonetheless, in relation to the 28W idle power of our test computer,
this amounts to a 70% overhead.
For RandomPower, we have both power overhead when CPU-
intensive workloads are launched to increase the overall power,
and performance overhead when CPU speed is throttled to reduce
the overall power. To evaluate the power and performance over-
heads, we run RandomPower with four different applications —
Machine learning training (ML), large file transfer in hard disk (IO),
word processing (Word), and web browsing (Web). Figs. 19(b) and
19(c) show the change in power and performance overheads as we
change the average power consumption target by changing the
mean of the truncated Gaussian random distribution. We calculate
the power overhead by subtracting the average power consumption
without RandomPower from the average power consumption with
RandomPower. For the performance overhead, we take the ML
training and file transfer completion times with RandomPower and
normalize the values with respect to those without RandomPower.
We exclude Word and Web from the performance overhead eval-
uation since they do not have completion times like ML or IO
applications. Note that during our experiments, we do not experi-
ence any significant perceivable impact of RandomPower on the
performance of word processing and web browsing.
We see that the power overheads increase with increasing av-
erage power consumption. Also, RandomPower’s power overhead
with perfect defense is lower than RandomNoise’s power over-
head at higher bit error rates. More importantly, however, we see
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Figure 19: (a) The power overhead of RandomNoise at different levels of effectiveness (i.e., NoDE’s bit error rates). The 15 ms
CPU load interval setting is marked as outliers. (b) Power overhead of RandomPower for different target average power. (c)
Performance overhead of RandomPower. Completion time is normalized to the case without RandomPower.
that different applications have different power overheads for the
same average power, with ML having a negative power overhead
when the average power is less than 70W. This is due to each ap-
plication’s power requirement. RandomPower running along an
application with a low power requirement mostly adds power to fol-
low its power target, whereas RandomPower needs to apply CPU
throttling more frequently to reduce power when the underlying
application requires more power. This is also why ML has a neg-
ative power overhead, indicating that due to frequent throttling
RandomPower has reduced the average power lower than the oth-
erwise average power requirement of ML without RandomPower.
From Fig. 19(c), it is also evident that frequent throttling at lower
average power targets causes a higher performance overhead for
the ML application. For the IO application, we do not see a signifi-
cant performance variation since CPU throttling does not severely
affect the file transfer speed. The key take-away from the results is
that the overhead for RandomPower depends on the underlying ap-
plication and, for power-hungry applications, reducing the power
overhead comes at the expense of performance degradation. A fa-
vorable balance between power and performance overheads can be
attained through careful choice of the random number distribution
parameters (e.g., mean).
RandomNoise vs RandomPower. RandomPower is more effec-
tive against NoDE than RandomNoise, since RandomPower offers
a perfect defense against NoDE and incurs a lower power over-
head as well, especially for power-hungry background applications.
However, RandomPower incurs possible performance overheads
due to the CPU throttling. It may also require additional OS privi-
leges and/or accesses for CPU throttling and instrumentation for
power sampling.
In addition to the aforementioned pro-active countermeasures,
a reactive defense approach would be to identify and remove data
exfiltration malware by monitoring application behavior or com-
puter CPU utilization. However, the constant emergence of new
malware remains as, and will continue being, one of the greatest
threats faced by computers [4, 59, 70, 72]. On the other hand, uti-
lizing the knowledge of NoDE for data exfiltration, one can design
a power network voltage monitoring system that continuously
scans through the voltage signals for suspicious switching noise
spike patterns in the high frequency. A potential drawback of this
approach is the computational burden to continuously monitor a
large frequency spectrum since PFC-induced switching noise is
generated by every computer power supply unit.
In summary, we see that different countermeasures againstNoDE
have their ownmerits and hurdles. Based on our study, as a hardware-
based defense, we recommend the installation of power noise filters
because of its attenuation on PFC-induced switching noises. As for
the software-based technique, we recommend power randomization
due to its effectiveness.
8 RELATEDWORK
There have been a plethora of studies on data exfiltration under
a threat model where an adversary tries to extract information
from a tightly secured computer system without using traditional
data transfer protocols (e.g., network). The key idea is to encode
information in physical attributes (e.g., the heat generated by a
computer [31]) to carry it to an external receiver (e.g., temperature
sensor). Meanwhile, decoding changes of these physical attributes
does not require any cyber access to the target system, thus by-
passes the system’s defense and forms covert channels for stealing
information. Alternatively, a secure system may spill its secrets by
inadvertently influencing an externally visible physical property
(i.e., a side channel) [22–24].
Table 3 summarizes the physical medium, key design attributes,
transmission rates, and effective distances of the recently proposed
data exfiltration attacks. Compared to the existing research, NoDE
achieves a reasonably high bit rate of 28.48 bits/s. Most acoustic
covert/side channels cannot achieve a transfer rate higher than
NoDE, except for [8] (140 bits/s) which requires the target to be
equipped with a speaker and the receiver be in the same room
as the target computer. [8] can reach up to 67,000 bits/s only in
the audible range (20Hz∼20kHz) at the expense of high detection
possibility. On the other hand, both electromagnetic emanation and
magnetic covert/side channel can achieve similar transfer rates as
NoDE but have much shorter effective distances. [29] can reach a
commendable speed of 1000 bits/s but requires professional-grade
receiver hardware with a high sophistication.
Among all, optical covert channels attain the best transmission
rates because of the extremely fast response time of LEDs. But,
they require the receiver to be in the line of sight of the transmitter
(e.g., be in the same room). Also, because of the high bit rates,
photodiodes need to be used as the receiver, further restricting the
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Table 3: Summary of Data Exfiltration Attacks with Different Media.
Medium Proposed Design Bit Rate Effective Distance
Acoustic
HDD noise [32], Fan noise [34], Mesh network [38],
RSA key extraction [24], Computer speakers [8]
Gyroscope modulation using ultrasound [21]
0.25∼140 bits/s 0∼11 meters
Thermal Computer generated heat [31] 0.0022 bits/s 0.4 meters
Electromagnetic
emanation
CRT monitor EMI radiation[48], Memory bus [29],
Extracting cryptographic key [6, 22, 23] 2∼512 bits/s 0∼20 meters
Magnetic Hard drive head [58], Escaping Faraday cage [36] 4∼40 bits/s 0.15∼1.5 meters
Optical Equipment status LED [55], HDD LED [37] 4∼56 kbits/s Line of sight
Power
Power consumption [35],
Mobile’s charging power [73],
Key extraction from mobile’s power analysis [23]
2∼1000 bits/s
(projected)
Length of
power/charging
cable
effective distance even within the line of sight. In contrast, NoDE
can have the transmitter and receiver in two different rooms that
are 27.4 meters away from each other without line of sight.
Another important aspect of NoDE is that unlike other studies
which cannot achieve both their highest bit rate and longest dis-
tance for the same settings (i.e., increasing distance decreases bit
rate), NoDE works at the 27.4 meters distance without compromis-
ing its rate of 28.48 bits/s at 0% bit error. While Table 3 is not an
exhaustive list, it provides important insights into the potential
and limitation of various physical covert/side channels-based data
exfiltration attacks.
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we studied data exfiltration from a desktop com-
puter in an enterprise environment, and proposed NoDE to achieve
stealthy information transfer over a building’s power network with-
out using any PLC adapters. NoDE exploits high-frequency switch-
ing noises caused by the PFC circuits built into all of today’s comput-
ers and achieves an effective rate of 28.48 bits/secondwith a distance
of 90 feet (27.4 meters) without line of sight. We validated NoDE’s
data exfiltration capability under different settings and hardware
configurations. We also showed that certain configurations such as
CPU speed scaling may reduce NoDE’s data exfiltration rates. In
addition, we offered some insights into the limitations and open
issues of our proposed system. Finally, we outlined a few possible
defenses and suggested both hardware-based and software-based
techniques.
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APPENDIX
A RELATED NOTIONS
Power spectrum/ frequency spectrum: Power spectrum disinte-
grates a signal into its frequency components and show the power
of each frequency component. To illustrate the changes in hap-
pening in different frequency components of a signal, the power
spectrum or frequency spectrum is typically shown over time with
heat maps.
Passband: In signal processing, filters are applied on a signal
to attenuate undesired frequency components while let pass the
useful frequency components. The passband refers to the frequency
range that a filter allows to pass through. The passband is identified
using the lower and upper cutoff frequencies. When a filter allows a
specific frequency band to pass, it is called a band-pass filter. When
the passband starts at zero (i.e., lower cutoff = 0 Hz), it is called
a low-pass filter. When the passband ends at infinity (i.e., upper
cutoff - infinity Hz) it is called a high-pass filter.
Harmonics: Harmonics are frequency components at multiples
of the fundamental frequency. In power system, harmonics are
produced when the 50Hz/60Hz sinusoidal voltage or current gets
distorted by non-linear loads (such as SMPS). Harmonics in the
power system create unwanted losses in power transmission.
B VOLTAGE FROM A POWER OUTLET
We show in Fig. 20(a) a snapshot of the voltage trace collected from
a power outlet in our lab. It can be seen that the supplied voltage
varies by more than 500mV within just a few minutes. We further
show the probability mass function (PMF) of a 24-hour voltage
distribution in Fig. 20(b), demonstrating a nearly 5V variation in
the actual supplied voltage.
(a) A snapshot of voltage (b) PMF of voltage
Figure 20: The voltage of a power outlet varies over time.
C COMPUTER’S POWER SUPPLY UNIT
C.1 Conduction Modes for PFC
In Table 4, we show a summary of major conduction modes for PFC
circuits used in today’s computers.
C.2 PFC Switching Frequency Variation
We show the cumulative density function (CDF) of our Dell Opti-
plex’s PFC switching frequency variation in Fig. 21(a). We see that
the PFC switching frequency varies no more than 50Hz within 5
seconds. In Fig. 21(b), we also show the frequency spectrum over a
5 second window and confirm that there is only a small variation
in the PFC switching frequency.
Table 4: Summary of Major Conduction Modes for PFC [64]
Conduction
Mode
Power
Rating
Current
Waveform
Frequency
Analysis Property
Continuous
Conduction
Mode (CCM)
>300W
- Fixed frequency
- Large inductor
- Lowest peak current
Discontinuous
Conduction
Mode (DCM)
<300W
- High peak current
- Reduced inductance
- Good stability
Critical
Conduction
Mode (CrCM)
<300W - Varying frequencies- High peak current
(a) CDF (b) Frequency spectrum
Figure 21: PFC switching frequency variation over time.
C.3 Current Drawn by Microsoft Surface Book
We show the measured current drawn by a Microsoft Surface Book
with a 65W power rating in Fig. 22(a) and the frequency analy-
sis of the current in Fig. 22(b). We see that the current waveform
looks by no means like the sine voltage waveform and the total
harmonic components are even stronger than the 60Hz component
in terms of power spectral density (PSD). Beyond 20kHz, the inten-
sity of harmonics decreases to an extremely low level, leaving only
background noise.
(a) Current and voltage waveforms (b) Frequent analysis of current
Figure 22: The current drawn by a Microsoft Surface Book
contains a significant amount of harmonics.
D ALGORITHM FOR CURRENTMODULATOR
We design a simple current modulator as described in Algorithm 3.
The current modulator program takes 1/0 bit streams as the input
and runs some dummy calculations (e.g., generating random num-
bers) to load the CPU and change the computer’s input current.
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Algorithm 3 Current Modulator
1: Input: Bit stream B and symbol duration T
2: for every bit Bi do
3: if Bi == 1 then
4: Run dummy calculations for T milliseconds
5: else
6: Idle for T milliseconds
7: end if
8: end for
E DATA EXFILTRATION RESULTS
E.1 Experiment on Dell Optiplex Computer
NoDEwith different background application. Now, we run ex-
periments on our Dell Optiplex computer under settings different
from the default one. First, to run a concurrent program to mimic
user’s normal activity, we play “See You Again” on YouTube on a
Google Chrome browser, which is one of the most viewed videos
[62]. We also run experiments using MS Word, web browsing, file
transfer, and machine learning training as background applications
resulting in 0%, 0%, 3.5%, and 1.67% bit error rates, respectively. In
the MS word experiment, we mimic user behavior by repeatedly
opening a new file, typing a few lines of texts and then saving the
file. For the web browsing experiment, we open new popular web-
sites (e.g., GMail and Facebook), scroll through the page content,
and follow links to other pages. For the file transfer experiment, we
transfer a 5GB file from one HDD drive to another in our desktop
computer running Windows 10. For the machine learning experi-
ment, we repeat training Tensorflow in Python with 6000 samples
from the MNIST data set taking around fives minutes to finish [52].
We show snapshots of the detections in Fig. 27.
NoDEwith different number of CPU cores.Next, we restrict
the number of cores that are assigned to the modulation program
in NoDE, and show the experimental results in Fig. 28.
NoDE with different pilot lengths. Finally, we consider 4-bit
(“1101”) and 8-bit (“11001010”) pilot sequences, and show the ex-
periment results in Fig. 29.
E.2 Experiment Using Multiple Transmitters
Fig. 30 shows the snapshot of data exfiltration for different trans-
mitters from our multi-transmitter experiment. Our results show
0% error for TX#1 and TX#4 while 6.8% and 1.1% error for TX#2
and TX#3, respectively.
E.3 Impact of CPU scaling on the transmitter
Snapshots of detection results for 10%, 50%, and 100% CPU states
are shown in Fig. 31.
E.4 Experiment Without Line of Sight
Fig. 32 shows the snapshot of data exfiltration when the receiver
and transmitters are placed in two separate rooms 90 feet away
from each other in Building B.
(a) Bit length = 100ms
(b) Bit length = 50ms
Figure 23: Frequency spectrum showing a data frame trans-
mitted by the iMac.
E.5 Experiment on Other Computers
Fig. 33 shows the experiment results for our Acer computer, our
custom built computer #1, and our custom built computer #2.
E.6 Experiment on iMac
We conduct our experiment on an Apple iMac 27-inch computer in
Lab #1. The transmitter and the receiver are placed 55 feet away
from each other. The iMac has an all-in-one compact design with
monitor and other components assembled together and powered
by a single power supply unit.
We first show the frequency spectrum for a data frame trans-
mitted from the iMac with a symbol length of 100ms in Fig. 23(a),
which reveals that the PFC-induced frequency spike of the iMac is
around 101kHz. It also shows that frequency band that carries the
transmitted data has a much wider bandwidth of ∼1kHz compared
to the Dell computers’ frequency bands in Fig. 12. Further, while
not explicitly indicated in Fig. 23(a), the frequency amplitudes in
the transmitted band is reversed, where the “1”s has lower ampli-
tude and “0”s has a higher amplitude. We also show the frequency
spectrum for a symbol length of 50ms in Fig. 23(b). The figures
show the detection accuracy significantly deteriorates as we in-
crease the symbol rate. In fact, we can not have successful data
transmission for our default symbol length of 33ms. This is mainly
due to the iMac’s power supply unit has a slower response to the
power demand compared to other computers in our experiments.
Next, we show a snapshot of data exfiltration from the iMac for
four different symbol lengths ranging from 50ms to 125ms in Fig. 34.
As discussed before, the bit error rate decreases as we increase the
symbol length. However, since a higher symbol length means a
lower maximum bits/second, the overall bit transfer rate decreases.
F PMF OF NOISE IN EXTRACTED SIGNAL
AMPLITUDES
We set the average signal amplitude of filtered voltage signals when
transmitted bits are 1 as the reference signal amplitude for bit 1.
When the transmitted bit is 1, any deviation of an actually received
bit-wise signal amplitude from the reference value is considered
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as noise. Similarly, we also obtain the reference signal amplitude
for bit 0, and obtain the noise. Next, we show the PMF of noise
for both Dell Optiplex and Dell PowerEdge computers in Fig. 24.
The noise amplitude distribution does not seem to be Gaussian. In
other words, our covert channel is likely corrupted by non-Gaussian
noises.
(a) Dell Optiplex computer (b) Dell PowerEdge computer
Figure 24: PMF of noise in extracted signal amplitudes.
G DEFENSE MECHANISM EXPERIMENTS
G.1 Experiment on a UPS-Powered Computer
We power our Dell PowerEdge computer through a CyberPower
UPS, which is plugged into a power outlet in the transmitter’s room
in Building B. In Fig. 35, we show that the receiver can still extract
information without errors. Thus, an UPS-powered computer does
not necessarily mean it is immune to the threat of NoDE, let alone
its added UPS cost.
G.2 Experiment in the Presence of Noise Filters
We plug in noise filter (X10 XPPF) [78] into a power outlet in the
transmitter’s room in Building B, and then plug in the power cord of
our PowerEdge computer into the noise filter. Although the inten-
sity of high-frequency PSD spikes in the receiver’s voltage signal
is reduced, it is still much higher than the power line background
noise and detectable. In Fig. 36, we show that the receiver can have
an effective rate of 25.57 bits/second. Although the transmission
distance is reduced compared to the no-filter case, the receiver can
still be located in another room without being restricted to the line
of sight of the transmitter.
G.3 Random Power Load Defense
We test the performance of a defense program that that injects
random power loads by randomly deciding to either run a CPU-
intensive computation or remain idle. We test NoDE’s performance
under varying settings of the defense program’s time interval of
the CPU loads, percent time of high CPU load, and number of CPU
cores used by the defense program. Figs. 37, 38, 39, and 40 shows
the snapshot of detection results for some selected cases of interest,
while Fig. 25 shows the power overhead for different settings. Fig. 26
shows the current drawn by the defense program with the CPU
load 20% and 60% of the times.
(a) (b)
Figure 25: Power overhead for the defense program. (a)
Power overhead remains same for different CPU load inter-
vals. (b) Impact of the number of cores utilized by the de-
fense program.
(a) 20% high CPU load
(b) 60% high CPU load
Figure 26: Current draw of the defense program running
with random high CPU loads. (a) 20% high CPU load. (b) 60%
high CPU load.
H SNAPSHOTS OF ALL DETECTION RESULTS
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(a) Youtube, bit error rate = 2.3%, bit rate = 27.82 bits/s (b) MS Word, bit error rate = 0%, bit rate = 28.48 bits/s
(c) Web browser, bit error rate = 0%, bit rate = 28.48 bits/s (d) File transfer, bit error rate = 3.5%, bit rate = 27.48 bits/s
(e) Machine learning, bit error rate = 1.67%, bit rate = 28 bits/s
Figure 27: Different background applications.
(a) 1 core. 8.9% bit error rate, and 25.94 bits/second. (b) 2 cores. 2.5% bit error rate, 27.77 bits/second.
(c) 3 cores. 0.0%, 28.48 bits/second.
Figure 28: Dell Optiplex computer with different numbers of CPU cores assigned to the modulation program in NoDE. The
receiver filters its received voltage signals with passband of <67.28kHz, 67.34kHz>.
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(a) 4-bit pilot. A snapshot of data exfiltration. (b) 8-bit pilot. A snapshot of data exfiltration.
Figure 29: Dell Optiplex computer with different pilot sequences. The receiver filters its received voltage signals with passband
of <67.28kHz, 67.34kHz>.
(a) TX#1. 0.0% bit error rate. (b) TX#2. 6.8% bit error rate.
(c) TX#3. 1.1% bit error rate. (d) TX#4. 0.0% bit error rate.
Figure 30: Snapshots of data exfiltration with multiple transmitters.
(a) 10% maximum processor state, 8% bit error rate, and 26.2 bits/second (b) 50% maximum processor state, 0% bit error rate, and 28.48 bits/second
(c) 100% maximum processor state,0% bit error rate, and 27.48 bits/second
Figure 31: Dell Optiplex computer with different CPU’s maximum power states.
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Figure 32: Dell PowerEdge computer in Building B with no line of sight between the receiver and transmitter. The voltage
signal is filtered with a passband of <65.77kHz, 65.83kHz>.
(a) Acer (b) Custom built #1
(c) Custom built #2
Figure 33: Data exfiltration from different computers.
(a) Symbol length = 50ms, bit error rate = 16%, and bit per second = 15.79 (b) Symbol length = 66ms, bit error rate = 8%, and bit per second = 13.1
(c) Symbol length = 100ms, bit error rate = 2%, and bit per second = 9.2 (d) Symbol length = 125ms, bit error rate = 0%, and bit per second = 7.52
Figure 34: Snapshots of data exfiltration with iMac computer for different bit durations.
Figure 35: Dell PowerEdge computer powered by aCyberPowerUPS. The voltage signal is filteredwith a passband of<65.77kHz,
65.83kHz>. The resulting bit error rate is 0.0% and the effective bit rate is 28.48 bits/second.
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Figure 36: Dell PowerEdge computer with a power line noise filter plugged into the power outlet. The voltage signal is filtered
with a passband of <65.78kHz, 65.84kHz>. The resulting bit error rate is 10.2% and the effective bit rate is 25.57 bits/second.
(a) Symbol length = 15 ms, high CPU load = 20% times, bit error rate = 0% (b) Symbol length = 33 ms, high CPU load = 20% times, bit error rate = 0%
(c) Symbol length = 66 ms, high CPU load = 20% times, bit error rate = 0%
Figure 37: Impact CPU loading intervals with CPU loads 20% of the times..
(a) Symbol length = 15 ms, high CPU load = 60% times, bit error rate = 20% (b) Symbol length = 33ms, high CPU load = 60% times, bit error rate = 30%
(c) Symbol length = 66 ms, high CPU load = 60% times, bit error rate = 30%
Figure 38: Impact CPU loading intervals with CPU loads 60% of the times..
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(a) CPU core = 1, high CPU load = 20% times, bit error rate = 0% (b) CPU core = 2, high CPU load = 20% times, bit error rate = 0%
(c) CPU core = 3, high CPU load = 20% times, bit error rate = 0% (d) CPU core = 4, high CPU load = 20% times, bit error rate = 0%
Figure 39: Impact of number of cores used by the defense program with CPU loads 20% of the times.
(a) CPU core = 1, high CPU load = 60% times, bit error rate = 6% (b) CPU core = 2, high CPU load = 60% times, bit error rate = 30%
(c) CPU core = 3, high CPU load = 60% times, bit error rate = 44% (d) CPU core = 4, high CPU load = 60% times, bit error rate = 44%
Figure 40: Impact of number of cores used by the defense program with CPU loads 60% of the times
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